Millenium Page 2

  However, even had Gregory appreciated the full scale of his task, he would surely not have shrunk from it. What lay at stake, so he believed, was the very future of mankind: for unless the Church were kept sacrosanct, what hope for a sinful world? No wonder, then, pre­sented with the opportunity, that the Pope had dared to make an example of his most formidable opponent. 'The King of Rome, rather than being honoured as a universal monarch, had been treated instead as merely a human being - a creature moulded out of clay.'8

  Contemporaries, struggling to make sense of the whole extraordi­nary business, perfectly appreciated that they were living through a convulsion in the affairs of the Christian people that had ho precedent, nor even any parallel. 'Our whole Roman world was shaken.'9 What, then, could this earthquake betoken, many wondered, if not the end of days? That the affairs of men were drawing to a close, and the earth itself growing decrepit, had long been a widespread presumption. As the years slipped by, however, and the world did not end, so people found themselves obliged to grope about for different explanations. A formidable task indeed. The three decades that preceded the show­down at Canossa, and the four that followed it, were, in the judgement of one celebrated medievalist, a period when the ideals of Christendom, its forms of government and even its very social and economic fabric 'changed in almost every respect'. Here, argued Sir Richard Southern, was the true making of the West. 'The expansion of Europe had begun in earnest. That all this should have happened in so short a time is the most remarkable fact in medieval history.'10

  And, if remarkable to us, then how much more so to those who actually lived through it. We in the twenty-first century are habituated to the notion of progress: the faith that human society, rather than inevitably decaying, can be improved. The men and women of the eleventh century were not. Gregory, by presuming to challenge Henry IV, and the fabulously ancient nimbus of tradition that hedged emper­ors and empires about, was the harbinger of something awesome. He and his supporters might not have realised it - but they were intro­ducing to the modern West its first experience of revolution.

  It was a claim that many of those who subsequently set Europe to shake would no doubt have viewed as preposterous. To Martin Luther, the one-time monk who saw it as his lifetime's mission to reverse everything that Gregory had stood for, the great Pope appeared a lit­erally infernal figure: 'Hollenbrand, or 'Hellfire'. In the wake of the Enlightenment too, as dreams of building a new Jerusalem took on an ever more secular hue, and world revolution was consciously enshrined as an ideal, so it appeared to many enthusiasts for change that there existed no greater roadblock to their progress than the Roman Catholic Church.

  Not that one necessarily had to be a radical, or even a liberal, to believe the same. 'We shall not go to Canossa!'" So fulminated that iron chancellor of a reborn German Empire, Prince Bismarck, in 1872, as he gave a pledge to the Reichstag that he would never permit the papacy to stand in the way of Germany's forward march to modernity. This was to cast Gregory as the very archetype of reaction: a charac­terisation that many Catholic scholars, albeit from a diametrically opposed perspective, would not have disputed. They too, like the Church's enemies, had a stake in downplaying the magnitude of what Canossa had represented. After all, if the papacy were to be regarded as the guardian of unchanging verities and traditions, then how could it possibly have presided over a rupture in the affairs of Europe no less momentous than the Reformation or the French Revolution?

  Gregory, according to the conventional Catholic perspective, was a man who had brought nothing new into the world, but rather had laboured to restore the Church to its primal and pristine state. Since this was precisely what Gregory himself had always claimed to be doing, evidence for this thesis was not hard to find. But it was misleading, even so. In truth, there existed no precedent for the upheaval exemplified by Canossa- neither in the history of the Roman Church, nor in that of any other culture. The consequences could hardly have been more fateful. Western Europe, which for so long had languished in the shadow of vastly more sophisticated civilisations, and of its own ancient and vanished past, was set at last upon a course that was to prove irrevocably its own.

  It was Gregory, at Canossa, who stood as godfather to the future.

  Ever since the West first rose to a position of global dominance, the ori­gins of its exceptionalism have been fiercely debated. Conventionally, they have been located in the Renaissance, or the Reformation, or the Enlightenment: moments in history that all consciously defined themselves in opposition to the backwardness and barbarism of the so- called 'Middle Age'. The phrase, however, can be a treacherous one. Use it too instinctively, and something fundamental - and distinctive— about the arc of European history risks being obscured. Far from there having been two decisive breaks in the evolution of the West, as talk of 'the Middle Ages' implies, there was in reality only one - and that a cataclysm without parallel in the annals of Eurasia's other major cultures. Over the course of a millennium, the civilisation of classical antiquity had succeeded in evolving to a pinnacle of extraordinary sophistication; and yet its collapse in western Europe, when it came, was almost total. The social and economic fabric of the Roman Empire unravelled so completely that its harbours were stilled, its foundries silenced, its great cities emptied, and a thousand years of history revealed to have led only to a dead end. Not all the pretensions of a Henry IV could truly serve to alter that. Time could not be set in reverse. There had never been any real prospect of reconstituting what had imploded - of restoring what had been lost.

  Yet still, long after the fall of Rome, a conviction that the only alter­native to barbarism was the rule of a global emperor kept a tenacious hold on the imaginings of the Christian people. And not on those of the Christian people alone. From China to the Mediterranean, the cit­izens of great empires continued to do precisely as the ancient Romans had done, and see in the rule of an emperor the only conceivable image of the perfection of heaven. What other order, after all, could there possibly be? Only in the far western promontory of Eurasia, where there was nothing of an empire left but ghosts and spatch­cocked imitations, was this question asked with any seriousness - and even then only after the passage of many centuries. Hence the full world-shaking impact of the events associated with Canossa. Changes had been set in train that would ultimately reach far beyond the bounds of western Europe: changes that are with us still.

  To be sure, Gregory today may not enjoy the fame of a Luther, a Lenin, a Mao — but that reflects not his failure but rather the sheer scale of his achievement. It is the incomplete revolutions which are remembered; the fate of those that succeed is to end up being taken for granted. Gregory himself did not live to witness his ultimate vic­tory - but the cause for which he fought was destined to establish itself as perhaps the defining characteristic of Western civilisation. That the world can be divided into church and state, and that these twin realms should exist distinct from each other: here are presumptions that the eleventh century made 'fundamental to European society and culture, for the first time and permanently'. What had previously been merely an ideal would end up a given.

  No wonder, then, as an eminent historian of this 'first European revolution' has pointed out, that 'it is not easy for Europe's children to remember that it might have been otherwise'.12 Even the recent influx into Western countries of sizeable populations from non-Christian cultures has barely served to jog the memory. Of Islam, for instance, it is often said that it has never had a Reformation - but more to the point might be to say that it has never had a Canossa. Certainly, to a pious Muslim, the notion that the political and religious spheres can be separated is a shocking one - as it was to many of Gregory's opponents.

  Not that it had ever remotely been Gregory's own intention to banish God from an entire dimension of human affairs; but revolu­tions will invariably have unintended consequences. Even as the Church, from the second half of the eleventh century onwards, set about asserting its independence from outside inte
rference by estab­lishing its own laws, bureaucracy and income, so kings, in response, were prompted to do the same. 'The heavens are the Lord's heavens— but the earth He has given to the sons of men.'15 So Henry IV's son pronounced, answering a priest who had urged him not to hang a count under the walls of his own castle, for fear of provoking God's wrath. It was in a similar spirit that the foundations of the modem Western state were laid, foundations largely bled of any religious dimension. A piquant irony: that the very concept of a secular society should ultimately have been due to the papacy. Voltaire and the First Amendment, multiculturalism and gay weddings: all have served as waymarks on the road from Canossa.

  Yet to look forward from what has aptly been dubbed 'the Papal Revolution', and to insist upon its far-reaching consequences, is to beg an obvious question: whatever could have prompted so convul­sive and fateful a transformation? Its origins, as specialists candidly acknowledge, 'are still hotly debated'.14 When Gregory met with Henry at Canossa, the papacy had already been serving as a vehicle for radical change for almost three decades- and pressure to reform it had been building for a decade or so before that. What could pos­sibly have been astir, then, during the early 1030s, capable of inspiring such a movement? The question is rendered all the more intriguing by a most suggestive coincidence: that the very years which witnessed the first stirrings of what would go on to become the Papal Revolution have been identified by many medievalists as the end- point of an earlier, and no less fateful, period of crisis. A crisis that was centred, however, not in the courts and basilicas of the mighty, but out in the interminable expanses of the countryside - and not in Germany or Italy, but in France. Here, from around 980 onwards, it has been argued, a violent 'mutation' took place, one that served to give birth, over the span of only a few decades, to almost everything that is today most popularly associated with the Middle Ages: castles, knights and all.

  Admittedly, the precise scope and character of this upheaval is intensely controversial, with some scholars disputing that it even so much as happened, and others claiming that it was a decisive turning point for Western Europe as a whole.15 Indeed, in a period of history that hardly lacks for treacherous bogs, the question of what precisely happened in France during the final decades of the tenth century and the opening decades of the eleventh has ended up as perhaps the most treacherous of all. French historians, for whom the entire debate has become a somewhat wearisome fixture, tend to sum it up with a single phrase: 'L'an mil', they call it - 'the year 1000'.

  A most arresting title. Scholarly shorthand it may be—and yet the date sounds no less hauntingly for that. Or does it only seem so to us - we who have passed from the second Christian millennium into the third? Historians, ever concerned not to foist contemporary pre­sumptions on to the past, have conventionally argued as much. Indeed, until a couple of decades ago, even those who made the case most exuberantly for a wholesale transformation of western Europe around the time of the Millennium were content to regard the year 1000 itself as having been one with no more inherent significance than, say, 1789 or 1914. That it lay slap bang in the middle of a period identi­fied by many historians as the birth-pangs of a radically new order - this, sober scholars insisted, was a mere coincidence, and nothing more. Certainly, any notion that the date might have generated the kind of apocalyptic anxieties that we, in the approach to the year 2000, projected on to the prophecies of Nostradamus and the Millennium Bug was regarded as utterly ludicrous: a fantasy to be slapped down quite as mercilessly as outre theories about the pyramids or the Templars. 'For the moment that one stops combating an entrenched historical error,' as one eminent medievalist sighed with weary hau­teur, 'back it immediately springs to life.'16

  No doubt - and yet lay into a hydra too indiscriminately and there is always the risk that truths as well as errors may end up being put to the sword. A neck may twist, and coil and snake - and yet, for all that, not merit being severed. 'The false terrors of the year one thousand',17 as one recent book termed them, have tended to be dismissed as a febrile and flamboyant concoction of the nineteenth- century Romantics - and yet that was not wholly fair. Often — surprisingly often, indeed - the myths about the first Millennium that twentieth-century historians set themselves to combat were of their own devising. A universal conviction that the world would end upon the very striking of the millennial hour; princes and peasants alike flocking to churches in panic as the fearful moment approached; an entire Christendom 'frozen in utter paralysis'18 - here were 'false terrors' indeed, grotesque and implausible straw men set up largely by the sceptics themselves. Not only were they distortions, in many cases, of what nineteenth-century historians had actually claimed; they were also, and infinitely more damagingly, distortions of the evidence that survived from the time of the Millennium itself.

  To talk of 'terrors' alone, for instance, is to ignore the profound degree to which, for the wretched, for the poor, for the oppressed, the expectation of the world's imminent end was bred not of fear but rather of hope, it comes, it comes, the Day of the Lord, like a thief in the night!'20 A warning, certainly, but also a message of joy — and significant not only for its tone but for its timing. The man who delivered it, a monk from the Low Countries who in 1012 had been granted a spectacular vision of the world's end by an archangel, no less, had not the slightest doubt that the Second Coming was at hand. That more than a decade had passed since the Millennium itself both­ered him not a jot: for just as the 'terrors of the year 1000' were not simply terrors, so also were they far from being confined to the year 1000 itself.

  To be sure, the millennial anniversary of Christ's birth was an obvi­ous focus for apocalyptic expectations - but it was not the only, nor even the principal, one. Far from abating in the wake of its passing, anticipation of the Day of Judgement seems, if anything, only to have grown over the course of the succeeding thirty-three years—as why, indeed, should it not have done? For to the Christian people of that fateful era had been granted a privilege that appeared to them as awe­some as it was terrible: 'to pass the span of their earthly lives in the very decades marking the thousand-year anniversary of their divine Lord's intervention into human history'.21 No wonder, then, 'at the approach of the millennium of the Passion',22 that anticipation of the Second Coming seems to have reached a fever pitch: for what was there, after all, in the entire span of human history, that could possibly compare for cosmic significance with Christ's death, resurrection and ascension into heaven? Nothing - not even His birth. The true Millennium, then, was not the year 1000. Rather, it was the anniversary of Christ's departure from the earth He had so fleetingly trodden. An anniversary that fell in or around the year 1033

  Such arguments — that people were indeed gripped by an anticipa­tion of the end days in the build-up to the Millennium, that it inspired in them a convulsive mixture of dread and hope, and that it reached a climax in the one-thousandth anniversary of the Resurrection - have ceased, over the past couple of decades, to rank as quite the heresies they previously were. Medievalists, like everyone else, have their fash­ions — and debate on the apocalyptic character of the year 1000 has recently been all the rage. No doubt, as critics have pointed out, the controversy owes much to timing: it can hardly be coincidence that it should have picked up such sudden pace over the years that immedi­ately preceded and followed the year 2000. Yet this does not serve to debunk it. Historians will inevitably garner insights from the times in which they work. To live through the turning of a millennium is a chance that does not come along every day. What, then, could be more self-defeating than to close one's eyes to the perspectives that such a once-in-a-thousand-years experience might provide?

  Certainly, it would be vain of me to deny that this study of the first Christian Millennium has not been inspired, to a certain degree, by reflections upon the second. In particular, it has been informed by a dawning realisation that the move into a self-consciously new era is not at all how I had imagined it would be. Nervous as I was, in my m
ore superstitious or dystopian moments, as to what the passage from 1999 to 2000 might bring, I had vaguely assumed that the world of the third millennium would feel brighter, more optimistic — younger even. But it does not.

  I can remember, back when I was in my teens, and living in the shadow of the Cold War, praying that I would live to see the twenty- first century, and all of the world with me; but now, having crossed that particular threshold, and looking ahead to the future, I find that I am far more conscious than I ever was before of how infinitely and terrifyingly time stretches, and of how small, by comparison, the span of humanity's existence is likely to prove. 'Earth itself may endure, but it will not be humans who cope with the scorching of our planet by the dying sun; nor even, perhaps, with the exhaustion of Earth's resources.'23 So wrote Martin Rees, Britain's Astronomer Royal, in a jeremiad cheerily titled Our Final Century: Will Civilisation Survive the Twenty- First Century?

  Far from having been inspired by any mood of fin de siecle angst, that book was in fact written in the immediate wake of the new mil­lennium; nor, since its publication in 2003, does the mood of pessimism among leading scientists appear to have grown any lighter. When James Lovelock, the celebrated environmentalist, first read Rees's book, he took it 'as no more than a speculation among friends and nothing to lose sleep over'; a bare three years on, and he was gloomily confessing in his own book, The Revenge of Gaia, 'I was so wrong.'24 The current state of alarm about global warming being what it is, even people unfamiliar with Lovelock's blood-curdling thesis that the world is on the verge of becoming effectively unin­habitable should be able to guess readily enough what prompted his volte-face. 'Our future', he has written memorably, if chillingly, 'is like that of the passengers on a small pleasure boat sailing quietly above the Niagara Falls, not knowing that the engines are about to fail.'25 And Lovelock's best estimate as to precisely when climate change will send us all over the edge? Within twenty to thirty years: some time around, say, 2033.